Only about 30 ships per day are transiting the Strait of Hormuz under U.S. facilitation — roughly 22% of the roughly 138 daily transits recorded before the war — even as U.S. Central Command insists the waterway is under control.

CENTCOM said Thursday that more than 40 commercial vessels had moved through the strait in the past 24 hours. "The United States and regional partners control the strait as commercial vessels continue to transit despite unwarranted IRGC aggression," CENTCOM said in a statement that rejected three Iranian claims.

The Joint Maritime Information Center (JMIC) paints a different picture. Its October 15 advisory counts 121 U.S.-facilitated transits between October 11 and 14 — about 30 ships per day. The military's figure of more than 40 covers a different 24-hour window and may signal a pickup in traffic, but a four-day average this thin leaves carriers and charterers operating at a fraction of normal volume.

Independent tracking suggests even less movement. JMIC's separate commercial tracking data recorded single-digit daily transits, though the two datasets use different methodologies and do not measure the same categories of traffic. That caveat cuts both ways: neither figure supports a return to normalcy.

What does 'control' mean for operators?

JMIC kept its threat assessment for the strait at SEVERE, warning that deliberate hostile action against commercial vessels remains highly likely. The advisory documented eight projectile attacks on October 11 and 13 alone, involving four tankers and four containerships.

The most serious incident involved the Singapore-flagged containership GFS PRIDE. Struck by a projectile on October 13, the vessel caught fire and sank on October 14 while under tow. All 21 crew members were safely evacuated.

CENTCOM rejected an IRGC claim that GFS PRIDE had struck a naval mine on an unauthorized route. "The civilian container ship M/V GFS Pride was hit by an IRGC projectile," CENTCOM said. The military maintains the strait's primary routes are clear of mines — yet JMIC simultaneously warned mariners about potential mining activity within and around the established traffic separation scheme. Both things cannot be fully reassuring at once.

A separate attack on the products tanker PETRO DOLPHIN near Sohar, Oman, left two crew members missing.

How broad is the escalation?

The pattern predates October. JMIC now counts 149 confirmed vessel incidents across the region since March 1, including nine newly documented cases in the latest reporting period. The International Maritime Organization separately lists 113 confirmed incidents and 24 seafarer fatalities as of October 14. The datasets differ and are not directly comparable.

The anchorage picture shows how much tonnage is sitting out the risk. As of October 15, JMIC counted roughly 180 vessels near Fujairah and Khor Fakkan, another 178 between Dubai, Jebel Ali and Ras Al Khaimah, and 74 around Musandam and Sohar — more than 430 ships idled across three clusters.

The security calculus is complicated further by the U.S. naval blockade of Iranian ports. As of October 10–11, U.S. forces had redirected 135 commercial vessels and disabled four during enforcement operations. Neutral shipping may still transit, but crews should expect military hailing, monitoring and possible inspections.

What are the residual risks?

JMIC flagged a continuing threat from IRGC surveillance, drone overflights, radio hailing and attempts to direct merchant ships toward the northern Iranian-controlled route. Vessels using the southern Omani corridor remain exposed to attack, and those broadcasting AIS positions face elevated targeting risk. Mariners were also warned about floating containers and debris near the GFS PRIDE wreck.

The gap between the military's claim of control and operational reality is the story for freight decision-makers. U.S. forces are facilitating transits, and ships are getting through. But attacks have continued despite that presence, volumes sit at a fraction of prewar levels, and JMIC advises that both the northern and southern corridors carry continued security risks and reduced traffic.

The unanswered question is whether U.S. security can enable genuinely normal commercial operations, or merely keep the strait passable for operators willing to absorb severe risk — a distinction that will determine when Hormuz capacity, and the rates that depend on it, begin to recover.