Gulf cargo routes widen as Hormuz resilience takes shape

By Tom Whitfield

The UAE and Saudi Arabia already operate two crude-export pipelines outside the Strait of Hormuz: Abu Dhabi’s Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline (ADCOP) to Fujairah and Saudi Arabia’s East-West Petroline to Yanbu. New investment is adding pipeline capacity, export infrastructure and port facilities at Fujairah, Khor Fakkan, Yanbu and Jeddah.

The waterway still carries crude oil, LNG, petrochemicals, dry-bulk imports and regional containerized cargo, and will remain the region’s primary maritime gateway for the foreseeable future. The USA-Israel-Iran war, however, is pushing Gulf states toward a different answer: multiple corridors and integrated transport networks rather than a single route.

Their aim is not to replace Hormuz. Nishal Sooredoo of Ocean Shipping Consultants, a Haskoning company, described the emerging system as “a multi-corridor transport system that reduces, rather than eliminates, dependence on Hormuz.”

What changes for each cargo mode?

• Liquid bulk: New pipelines and bypass ports give crude oil and refined products the clearest alternative to Hormuz. They stand to benefit most, while also facing the greatest disruption if access through the strait is restricted.
• LNG: The fuel remains more constrained. Its export facilities are concentrated within the Gulf, and the region has limited alternative export infrastructure outside Hormuz.
• Dry bulk and petrochemicals: Dedicated rail corridors can move high-volume sulphur, fertilisers and aggregates between industrial terminals and alternative gateways. Rail also offers advantages for petrochemicals.
• Containers: Expanded feeder services, linked with new rail connections, can connect containerized trade to ports that would otherwise depend on road transport through Hormuz.
• General cargo and Ro-Ro: These flows remain more dependent on trucks because they serve dispersed inland destinations where flexible road transport beats fixed rail networks.
• Steel and construction materials: Their balance may shift from imports and exports toward greater local production and consumption.

What does this change for shippers and carriers?

For shippers, the change is route redundancy rather than an immediate reduction in risk. Crude and refined products can use pipeline and bypass-port options; sulphur, fertilisers, aggregates and selected petrochemicals can use rail-linked terminals and gateways outside Hormuz. LNG, general cargo and Ro-Ro remain tied more closely to existing flows.

Carriers can develop feeder-and-rail services that move boxes and bulk cargo between inland industrial zones and Red Sea or Gulf ports. That gives them more ways to protect an affected route without abandoning the vessel network altogether.

Forwarders gain more combinations to design around Hormuz, combining feeder, rail, road and port legs. The constraint is cargo suitability: a bypass has little value where the commodity lacks pipeline access, an alternative export terminal or a connecting rail service.

Where do the new corridors run?

Saudi Arabia’s planned Landbridge railway is intended to connect Gulf ports with the Red Sea, Riyadh and major industrial clusters. The UAE continues expanding rail links among ports, industrial zones and neighboring Oman through the Hafeet Rail project.

The proposed GCC Railway and India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC) aim to strengthen regional and international supply chains. Both face delivery risks, uncertain implementation timetables and completion dates likely several years away.

Together, these projects shift the port from a standalone maritime gateway to an integrated logistics ecosystem. Ports increasingly need to combine rail, road, industrial zones and distribution centers rather than compete on berth position alone.

Which Gulf ports stand to gain?

• Alternative gateways: Fujairah, Yanbu, Duqm, Sohar, Salalah, Khor Fakkan and Jeddah could gain strategic importance as export, logistics and contingency routes diversify beyond Hormuz.
• Established hubs: Jebel Ali, Khalifa Port, Jubail and Dammam should remain resilient despite their exposure to the waterway. Their advantage comes from hinterland connections, integrated logistics and diversified industrial activity, not maritime location alone.
• More exposed locations: Ports with fewer mature bypass options or weaker integration into regional transport corridors face greater risk during prolonged disruption. That reflects their reliance on uninterrupted Hormuz access, not a decline in their underlying competitiveness.

The shift gives carriers and forwarders a broader network for contingency planning, but it also rewards ports that can turn infrastructure into dependable door-to-door services. A terminal without customs coordination, inland rail or trucking links offers less than its nominal capacity suggests.

Why is physical connectivity not enough?

Sooredoo’s warning is direct: “Connectivity alone is not enough.” Cross-border political cooperation, customs interoperability and route security will determine whether the new physical assets work as usable trade corridors.

Rail lines and pipelines may provide theoretical capacity, but their operational value depends on seamless regulatory coordination and stable regional conditions. That makes agreements and border processes part of the capacity calculation for shippers, carriers and forwarders.

Without that coordination, the Gulf’s alternatives remain vulnerable to the same regional instability that could close Hormuz. With it, pipelines, rail and expanded ports can turn theoretical capacity into maintainable trade flows during a maritime interruption.

Ports will also have to compete as service ecosystems. Their future value should come less from cargo throughput alone and more from integrated logistics services, industrial activity, warehousing, free zones and multimodal transport. The winners may not handle the most cargo; they may offer the most reliable, flexible and integrated paths to market.

Sooredoo has more than 20 years of experience in port economic feasibility, market studies, due diligence and transport infrastructure solutions for public- and private-sector clients.

Over the next several years, Gulf port competition should turn on delivered route capacity and policy execution, not location alone, as the UAE and Saudi Arabia test whether pipelines, rail and Red Sea gateways can become a working alternative to Hormuz.