Riyadh airport outbound cargo capacity remains at 6% of normal

Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport (RUH) is running at about 6% of normal outbound air-cargo capacity after losing roughly 1,500 tonnes a day, aviation consultancy Aevean reported.

RUH closed on October 10 after Houthi attacks, and airlines suspended operations at the Saudi hub. The airport partly reopened on Sunday, Reuters reported, but the Yemen-based Houthis continued to threaten further attacks, describing the site as a “military target,” while flight monitoring showed little aviation traffic.

The report did not give the year or Sunday’s date, so it does not support a precise calendar for the reopening. Nor did it identify an airport-wide baseline tonnage, which prevents a calculation of the exact volume behind the 6% operating level.

What does the partial reopening mean for cargo?

For shippers, carriers and forwarders, the immediate commercial constraint is outbound lift from RUH. Aevean’s estimate covers outbound capacity only; it provides no measured disruption for inbound traffic or connecting flows elsewhere in Saudi Arabia.

The 6% reading means active capacity is about 94% below normal. Without a normal daily tonnage, however, the report cannot express that remaining capacity in tonnes or calculate how much additional lift would restore the missing volume.

A partly reopened airport is not the same as restored airline schedules, especially with foreign carriers extending suspensions and attacks continuing. Forwarders cannot treat early traffic as evidence that cargo space has returned to normal, while carriers face a network in which the airport is open but only a fraction of its previous throughput is operating.

Aevean put the outlook plainly in a statement from Maarten Wormer, Head of Consulting at Aevean:

“Riyadh has lost around 1,500 tonnes of outbound air cargo capacity a day, and so far, very little of it has come back.

RUH’s capacity is still running at about 6 percent of normal. With attacks continuing and foreign carriers extending their suspensions, we expect a slow recovery rather than a quick one.”

That projection leaves available freight space constrained on routes where RUH served as the Saudi origin. Carriers cannot treat the partial reopening as a normalized schedule, and forwarders face fewer practical options than the airport’s open status suggests.

The report gives no airline-by-airline return schedule and no rate data, so it does not establish whether shippers faced a particular surcharge, price premium or spot-rate increase during the disruption.

Which trade lanes account for the loss?

Aevean estimated the following lost outbound capacity per day:

• Hong Kong: 115 tonnes
• Doha: 139 tonnes
• Dubai: 121 tonnes
• Dhaka: 112 tonnes
• Cairo: 98 tonnes

Together, those five city-pair losses total 585 tonnes a day, about 39% of the overall 1,500-tonne estimate. The published lane figures therefore leave most of the estimated reduction unallocated rather than reconciling it in full.

Aevean said the losses fell primarily on Asia, Gulf hubs and South Asia destinations, with Gulf hubs accounting for a quarter of the loss. That identifies the main regional effects but not the cargo types, airlines or customer commitments behind them.

The route mix shows why recovery may not be uniform. Dubai and Doha are Gulf destinations, Hong Kong belongs to the broader Asian market named by Aevean, and Dhaka falls within South Asia. Cairo provides a non-Gulf, non-Asian comparison.

No commodity, aircraft-type, customer or schedule split appears in the report, so it cannot show whether one segment absorbed a disproportionate share. It also gives no aircraft frequencies or normal tonnage, preventing a calculation of how many flights would be needed to restore the estimated capacity.

Why did cargo traffic fall back after reopening?

RUH opened with restrictions on October 18, and Aevean recorded a brief cargo spike on October 20. That improvement did not hold: cargo levels subsequently fell to what Aevean described as “well low, maybe to a third or a quarter of this level.”

The wording remains provisional. Aevean published no measured post-spike percentage, so one-third and one-quarter represent its estimate rather than two confirmed operating levels. The October 20 movement was not a stable recovery.

The sequence leaves RUH partly open but operationally impaired. Sunday’s partial reopening and the October 20 spike show that some aircraft and cargo handling resumed. Little monitored aviation traffic, continued attack threats and extended foreign-carrier suspensions explain why capacity remained near 6% of normal.

For freight buyers, the practical risk is continued scarcity of RUH-origin capacity, especially across the named Gulf and Asian lanes, while attacks continue and carriers keep suspensions in place. For carriers and forwarders, the absence of a restoration timetable argues for planning around a slow ramp rather than the partial reopening.

If attacks persist or more foreign airlines extend suspensions, Aevean’s expected slow recovery could stretch. If they ease, the October traffic burst still shows only what a constrained reopening handled, not proof that RUH can return to full capacity.

RUH’s outbound cargo capacity should therefore be treated as a fraction of normal, with Aevean supporting a cautious, slow path back rather than a rapid restoration.