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Africa's Industrial Projects Fail in the Gaps Between Sectors

Africa is not short of industrial plans — it is short of connections between them, says ACBA chief Miguel Ugochukwu Peters. Projects stall in the gaps between power, transport, offtake and finance, not inside any one sector.

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Tom Whitfield
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Africa’s Industrial Projects Stall Between The Links
Africa’s Industrial Projects Stall Between The LinksDidgeman / pixabay

Key points05

  • ACBA CEO Miguel Ugochukwu Peters argues African industrial projects fail in gaps between sectors, not within them
  • Three-part bankability test: infrastructure funded, plant sized to actual capacity, offtake committed
  • Lenders must price or walk away from each unresolved link; stacked risks stall financial close
  • Circular design at planning stage is cheaper than retrofitting, which is rarely done
  • Sequencing rules apply across energy, ports, cement, agro-processing, semiconductors and electronics

A food processing plant in Africa can have sound technology, a capable operator and a willing investor, and still fail — because the power supply is unreliable, the road to market is impassable part of the year, or no buyer has signed for the output. Every one of those problems sits outside the plant gate, and no single party owns the job of fixing it.

That is the argument laid out by Miguel Ugochukwu Peters, Chief Executive Officer of the African Circular Business Alliance (ACBA), an independent commercial and institutional body that works to align capital, industry and policy around Africa's industrial and infrastructure systems. His diagnosis is blunt: the continent is not short of industrial plans. What is missing is the connection between them.

Why the financing stalls

Energy, transport, production, buyers and finance are usually planned separately, by different parties, on different timelines. Projects then stall in the gaps between sectors rather than inside any one of them.

Lenders sit at the centre of the mechanism. A bank funds a project on its expected cash flow. Every unresolved link between power, logistics, production and sales is a risk the lender must either price or walk away from. Stack several of those risks together and capital becomes expensive — or simply does not arrive.

The result is familiar to anyone who has watched good African industrial projects die in diligence. Sound ventures struggle to reach financial close. It is rarely a shortage of money. The project, viewed as a whole, does not look bankable.

What does sequencing change for project developers?

Peters sets out three rules of order that apply whether the sector is energy, ports, cement, agro-processing or general manufacturing.

  • Infrastructure first. Power, transport and utilities should be planned — and ideally funded — before the plant that depends on them. A factory built ahead of its power supply spends its early years waiting.
  • Production second. Manufacturing and processing capacity should be sized to the infrastructure that actually exists, not the infrastructure hoped for.
  • Offtake secured before scale. Buyers must be confirmed before capacity expands. A signed purchase commitment gives the lender revenue it can underwrite and the producer room to grow.

The same logic, he notes, extends to newer industries such as semiconductors and electronics, which cannot scale without reliable power and logistics underneath them.

Who has to be at the table

A system of this kind cannot be built by one party, and ACBA is explicit about the cast list. Companies bring the project. Governments and public institutions set licensing, planning and tariff conditions. Development organisations and financial institutions supply debt, guarantees and grants. Growth-stage firms contribute technology and local capability.

Partnership structures turn that cooperation into contracts. Manufacturing partnerships, public-private partnerships, offtake agreements, joint ventures, technology licensing and blended finance each tie one link to the next. The skill, Peters argues, lies in choosing the right structure for the right link — and sequencing them so no party carries a risk it cannot manage.

Circularity belongs at the start

The cheapest moment to design a project for materials recovery, energy efficiency and reuse of industrial by-products is the planning stage. Retrofitting is slower, costlier and rarely done. Peters wants circular economy design built into the first drawings, not bolted on later. This is also where financiers and regulators hold the most influence, because both are in the room while the project takes shape.

Three questions before any approval

Peters offers governments, lenders and companies a three-part test for any industrial project:

  • Is the power and transport capacity the project needs already in place, or funded?
  • Is the plant sized to that capacity?
  • Has a buyer committed to take the output?

If any answer is no, the project is not yet bankable — whatever its other merits.

For shippers, forwarders and industrial investors watching Africa's trade lanes, the message is structural: cargo volumes follow plants that actually reach operation, and plants reach operation only when every link from the power line to the point of sale holds together. Peters' closing task for policymakers, financiers and industry is to make each link bankable, and to plan the links together.

Source: africa.com

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Tom Whitfield

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Market editor covering companies, deals and strategy in Ocean and air freight, container shipping at Waybill Wire.

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