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Yuan's Share of Russian Export Payments Halves to 22%

The yuan's share of Russian export payments has halved to 22% in 2026 despite growing trade, as US secondary sanctions force Chinese banks to retreat and costs climb.

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Marcus Bennett
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Russia bows out of attempt to replace US dollar with Chinese yuan after years of promoting currency alternatives among i
Russia bows out of attempt to replace US dollar with Chinese yuan after years of promoting currency alternatives among iTimon Studler / unsplash

Key points05

  • Yuan share of Russian export payments fell from a mid-2024 peak to 22% in 2026.
  • Russia now receives 69% of Asian export payments in rubles.
  • US secondary sanctions expanded June 12, 2024, targeting banks dealing with sanctioned Russian entities.
  • Alternative payment arrangements can cost up to 20% of the transfer amount, per STT Logistics.
  • Yuan held under 3% of global trade settlements in Q3 2025, per IMF, and fell to fifth in SWIFT payments.

The yuan's share of payments for Russian exports has fallen by half from its mid-2024 peak to just 22% in 2026, according to Bloomberg, citing the latest Russian central bank data. That figure, not a policy statement, marks the effective end of Moscow's campaign to put Chinese currency at the centre of its trade settlement — and it carries direct cost consequences for the freight and logistics operators still moving goods between the two countries.

The retreat is not a demand signal. Trade between Moscow and Beijing has kept growing, and China still accounts for more than a third of Russia's foreign trade turnover, per Bloomberg. What changed is the plumbing: on June 12, 2024, Washington expanded secondary sanctions on foreign banks dealing with sanctioned Russian entities, cutting Moscow's ability to settle in dollars — and, unexpectedly, in yuan as well.

What triggered the reversal?

Foreign banks that continued processing transactions for sanctioned Russian institutions risked losing access to US banking accounts and dollar payment channels. Washington also sanctioned the Moscow Exchange itself, forcing it to suspend dollar and euro trading.

Chinese banks responded by restricting Russian payments to protect their own access to the US financial system. Sergei Ishkov, a partner at consulting firm MCK Partners, told Kommersant that Chinese banks faced losing their American correspondent banking relationships if they kept processing payments for sanctioned Russian institutions.

"This, of course, is a gigantic loss," Ishkov said — the potential consequences outweighed the benefits of continuing business with Russia. The remark is candid by the standards of Russian commercial commentary, and it goes a long way toward explaining why the yuan's share of Russian export payments halved even as bilateral trade expanded.

What does it cost shippers and forwarders?

The commercial fallout for traders and logistics firms is quantifiable. According to Kommersant, Russian transport company STT Logistics estimates that alternative payment arrangements — smaller regional Chinese banks, or intermediaries holding yuan liquidity inside China — can cost businesses as much as 20% of the transfer amount. For a freight payment of any size, a 20% friction cost is not a rounding error; it is a freight-rate-level surcharge on every settlement.

The picture is not uniform. Some operators report no disruption. "I haven't noticed any issues with payments there in yuan," Alexey Kuchmin, CEO of AIR Group, told Kommersant, saying his company continues to process transactions without significant delays. Two operators, two experiences — the difference most likely lies in banking relationships, not in the currency itself.

Where did the rubles come in?

Russia now receives 69% of its export payments from Asian countries in rubles, a significant shift away from the Chinese currency. In effect, Moscow has swapped one workaround for another: direct ruble settlement with Asian counterparties has replaced the yuan as the primary channel.

The irony is hard to miss. Russia accelerated its pivot to the yuan after invading Ukraine in February 2022, when Western sanctions cut Moscow off from the global financial system. By 2024, the yuan accounted for nearly half of Russia's foreign trade settlements, became the most traded currency on the Moscow Exchange, and overtook the dollar in bank deposits.

How did the BRICS campaign fare?

President Vladimir Putin spent years promoting dollar alternatives through BRICS, winning rhetorical support from China, Brazil and South Africa, alongside newer African members Egypt and Ethiopia, with Nigeria and Uganda joining as partners. At the October 2024 BRICS summit in Kazan, he accused the United States of wielding its currency politically.

"The dollar is being used as a weapon. We really see that this is so," Putin said, calling the approach a major mistake.

The coalition behind the rhetoric, however, never unified. Members remain divided over replacing the dollar, with some favouring alternative payment systems rather than a substitute reserve currency.

Does the yuan have a global future?

The international data suggests the ceiling is low. According to the IMF, the yuan accounted for less than 3% of global trade settlements in the third quarter of 2025. SWIFT data cited by Kommersant shows it slipped from fourth to fifth place in global payments over the period, behind the Japanese yen.

Chinese President Xi Jinping is still pushing to expand the yuan's international use — but Beijing maintains capital controls and has never committed to replacing the dollar. That hesitation, more than any US Treasury action, may be the deeper constraint.

For shippers and forwarders on Russia-China lanes, the operational lesson is straightforward: settlement risk now costs up to 20% of transfer value on some routes, and the trajectory — tightening secondary sanctions, fragmented banking channels — points to more friction, not less, in the year ahead.

Source: africa.businessinsider.com

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Marcus Bennett

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Senior reporter covering regulation, policy and their impact on Ocean and air freight, container shipping at Waybill Wire.

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