Yttrium at $1.15m a Tonne Outside China Sets Stage for Trump-Xi Talks

Yttrium trades at roughly $1.15 million per tonne in Europe against $9,144 inside China — a 126-fold gap that frames every conversation US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping are expected to have on rare earths this month.

The two leaders are expected to meet on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Shenzhen, according to the source reporting, at a moment when manufacturers outside China are struggling to secure minerals for electric vehicles, defence equipment and electronics. Argus Media price data, reported by Bloomberg, shows the disparity is not confined to one element: dysprosium costs about 20 times more outside China, terbium around eight times more.

Those numbers reflect China's grip on the rare earth supply chain — above all its processing capacity, not merely its mining output. Beijing's export restrictions, first proposed over a year ago, have made it harder for foreign manufacturers to obtain certain materials, handing the world's second-largest economy considerable leverage over the industries that depend on them.

What did China actually suspend?

On November 9, China extended the suspension of additional export restrictions until January 10, 2027. The measures cover five rare earth elements — holmium, erbium, thulium, europium and ytterbium — along with certain processing technologies and equipment.

Read the fine print, though. Controls introduced in April 2025 on seven other elements, including yttrium, dysprosium and terbium, remain fully in place. That distinction matters for shippers and manufacturers: the very minerals facing the sharpest price pressures are still subject to export licensing. The suspension buys time; it does not remove the bottleneck.

Is Africa the alternative?

Washington and other major economies are looking to reduce dependence on Chinese supply, and Africa is attracting growing attention as a potential alternative source.

The US is already committing capital. In August, Reuters reported that the US International Development Finance Corporation had committed $62.8 million to rare earth projects in Malawi, Angola, Madagascar and South Africa. South Africa's Phalaborwa project alone accounts for approximately $50 million of that funding.

The caveat is stark: none of the four projects had entered production at the time of the report. Securing investment and establishing a reliable supply chain are two different things, and the gap between them runs in years, not months.

Other African projects are moving up the value chain:

• Nigeria — A $400 million rare earth and critical metals processing plant is under development in Uke, Nasarawa State, built by Hasetins Commodities Limited. It is expected to add 12,000 tonnes of annual processing capacity and lift the company's total to 18,000 tonnes when fully operational.
• Gabon — The long-delayed Mabounié niobium and rare earth deposit is being revived through a proposed $2 billion development with Emirati-backed New Energy Metals and Chinese engineering group ENFI. The plan includes several processing facilities inside Gabon rather than raw extraction and export. Construction is set to begin in 2027, though the project has yet to reach production.

Why deposits alone won't close the gap

Africa cannot quickly replace China, and the reasons are structural. Mining projects take years to develop. Processing requires specialised technology, infrastructure, reliable power and substantial financing.

The commercial risk is equally real. Reuters reported that private investors remain hesitant to finance African rare earth projects, partly because of their higher risk profile and concerns that Chinese market intervention could undermine prices and project economics. Beijing's pricing power cuts both ways: it can squeeze buyers abroad, and it can flatten the returns that would make competing mines bankable.

African governments also face a policy balancing act. They want investment from the US and other countries seeking alternatives to China, but they need new projects to build local industrial capacity rather than turning the continent into another source of raw materials. The Gabon structure — processing facilities onshore — is the model that ambition implies; whether it survives to construction in 2027 is untested.

The Trump-Xi meeting could offer clarity on the direction of global rare earth trade. Even so, the source is explicit on one point: even if the two leaders reach an agreement, the push to diversify supply chains is unlikely to disappear. For African countries with promising deposits, the opportunity lies not in selling more minerals but in capturing a place in the processing and manufacturing industries that will determine who benefits most from growing demand for critical materials.