TiL: Tariff timing, not levels, drove terminal cargo surges

By Amara Osei

At a 10% to 15% U.S. tariff range, TiL expects almost no impact on container volume. Sudden announcements before deadlines do the real damage.

At TOC Americas in Cartagena, delegates heard that diagnosis from Tom van Eynde, TiL Group’s director for terminal investments in North America. He argued that the announcements, rather than the tariff levels themselves, trigger costly cargo surges that box terminals cannot absorb.

Where did the cargo move?

Van Eynde said TiL had seen certain trade flows to the United States through Canadian ports decline. TiL terminals at U.S. ports then automatically picked up that cargo, turning reduced Canadian routing into additional American terminal volume.

Van Eynde said: “They’re not really reducing the trade flows, they’re just relocating them.” He described the previous year or two of tariff introductions and cancellations as a wild ride. He expects this round of disruption to be temporary.

His conclusion was not that tariffs had destroyed container trade, but that policy had moved it between routes. At 10% to 15%, van Eynde said, terminal operators see very little impact on volume.

That matters because a stable percentage changes the economics of a shipment less than a last-minute policy notice changes its timetable. The cargo still moves, but the deadline decides when and where it arrives.

Why did the deadline matter more?

The biggest damage came not from the tariffs themselves but from sudden announcements that prompted cargo to move before a deadline. Once the deadline passed, conditions returned to normal. “That is probably the element that has hurt us most,” van Eynde said.

That timing advantage sits with ocean carriers. They can respond to a surge by chartering extra vessels and running a new swing, and van Eynde said those responses even lifted freight rates in carriers’ favor.

Terminals cannot match that speed. Building more capacity takes years of planning and permitting, van Eynde said, so demand may shift again before new capacity is ready. One decision can add a sailing; the other takes years to permit. The mismatch is simple and expensive.

TiL can add container-handling gangs and equipment to absorb a sudden peak. But the extra activity brings congestion to the yard and rail operation, while increasing the cost per box. Van Eynde said that higher cost was eating into margins and that terminals take the biggest hit from sudden policy swings.

How did the costs split?

For shippers, the commercial split is clear. Carriers can add vessels and capture stronger rates during a rush; terminals absorb congestion, rail pressure and higher per-box costs. The end customer may see capacity appear quickly, yet still encounter a crowded yard after the ship arrives.

Forwarders can move bookings and arrange additional sailings as carriers charter vessels. What they cannot manufacture by the deadline is terminal capacity, including gates, yard space, equipment and rail throughput. Capacity that arrives by sea still has to cross the yard.

That sequence explains why the policy announcement creates a larger operational shock than the final tariff percentage. The first changes behavior across the network; the second eventually becomes a cost line.

What is TiL’s bigger bet?

TiL is investing more aggressively than ever, van Eynde said, as it offsets political risk in its portfolio. Its position as the main terminal partner for MSC, the biggest carrier and a carrier still growing faster than the market, is central to that strategy.

The partnership gives TiL exposure to expanding carrier volume while U.S. trade policy keeps the operating risk high. More investment does not erase the timing mismatch, however. Capital spending can improve future handling capacity, but it cannot remove the congestion created by a deadline announced only weeks earlier.

What does this change for shippers and forwarders?

The practical answer is to distinguish tariff level from announcement risk. A carrier can charter capacity against a deadline, but no carrier or forwarder can add gates, yard space or rail throughput by the same deadline. Shippers should therefore expect peak-period terminal costs and congestion even when ocean capacity expands.

Forwarders retain some leverage because carriers can charter extra vessels and run additional swings. Their customers gain available sailings, but not relief at a terminal whose fixed operations cannot expand on the same schedule. Once tariff policy settles around 10% to 15%, TiL expects volumes to normalize and disruption to ease.

If tariff policy remains within that band and stops producing sudden deadlines, container volumes should normalize. Until then, carriers can chase the spike while terminals still pay for it.