Sierra Leone launches SLOSCO with Chinese partner and 50-ship ambition

Sierra Leone inaugurated a national shipping company on 19 October with a stated ambition of operating 50 vessels and clawing back a bigger share of the country's freight earnings. The Sierra Leone Ocean Shipping Company, or SLOSCO, is 70% owned by China's Zhejiang Xiehai Group and 30% by the state-owned Sierra Leone National Shipping Agency (SLNSA).

The pitch is simple. Sierra Leone wants to keep more of the money generated by its imports and mineral exports, rather than watching it flow to foreign carriers. Fine as an ambition. The execution record is less encouraging.

What happened to the previous Chinese-backed projects?

Two earlier ventures set the cautionary tone. In November 2017, ICBC and China Eximbank agreed to finance a $659m expansion of Freetown's Queen Elizabeth II Quay, backed by a sovereign guarantee. The repayment structure leaned partly on port-related revenues — a model that could have raised costs for shipping lines and cargo owners. The project stalled after the 2018 change of government.

Then came the harder details. An investigation by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, published in September 2026, found that ICBC had committed to financing before completing due diligence, with subsequent compliance checks flagging corruption allegations involving individuals connected to the developer. ICBC ultimately declined to disburse. The developer's representatives rejected the allegations.

The second non-event: in 2018, Sierra Leone cancelled the proposed $318m Mamamah International Airport, judging the investment economically unjustifiable given how little the existing airport was used. Two projects, nearly a billion dollars of ambition, nothing built.

Is SLOSCO different this time?

Structurally, yes. SLOSCO is an equity joint venture, not a sovereign-guaranteed infrastructure loan. Xiehai is an established operator with a fleet of 42 vessels and a commercial network, which means SLOSCO can enter the market without buying dozens of ships or loading the state with debt.

But the boundary is blurry. Nobody has clearly distinguished which vessels SLOSCO will actually own, which it will charter from Xiehai, and which Xiehai will merely manage commercially. In shipping, that distinction is rather the whole story.

The potentially bigger lever is regulatory. The Sierra Leone National Shipping Agency Act 2025 grants the national carrier discretionary rights over the transportation of 40% of the value of the country's imports and exports. That could matter more than the fleet itself.

Except — cargo value is not freight revenue, and statutory rights do not automatically become shipping contracts. Much of Sierra Leone's mineral trade runs through international commodity buyers and exporters who may already control vessel nominations. The open question is whether SLOSCO can compete commercially or will lean on preferential cargo access.

What about governance risk?

There is also the uncomfortable context. The well-documented case of Dutch drug trafficker Jos Leijdekkers — sentenced in absentia by Dutch courts to more than 100 years in prison over several murders — has placed Freetown's maritime connections under scrutiny. Reporting, including a detailed Guardian investigation, describes how established shipping routes and household-name carriers from Freetown have been used to move cocaine from South America to Europe. It raises the possibility, at least, that a new legitimate shipping business could serve as cover for an illegitimate one. No evidence connects SLOSCO to any such activity.

What does this change for shippers?

For carriers and forwarders calling at Freetown, the immediate practical issue is the 40% cargo-transportation right. If it is enforced aggressively, lines currently carrying Sierra Leonean import and mineral export volumes could find nominations shifting toward SLOSCO. If it stays discretionary and unexercised, nothing changes but the letterhead.

The economics remain demanding either way. Freight revenue has to cover vessel operating costs, charter hire, financing and insurance — and 70% of the equity belongs to the Chinese partner. Sierra Leone's gains would come through employment, taxes, dividends and maritime expertise, which is real but secondary.

The decisive test is not the vessel count or the statutory cargo share. It is whether SLOSCO delivers competitive freight services, sustainable returns and measurable value for the country. After one stalled port and one abandoned airport, the ships at least already exist. The business model still has to prove it can float on its own.