Eighty per cent of dangerous goods incidents reported to IATA in the first half of 2025 involved undeclared or hidden hazardous materials — lithium batteries, e-cigarettes and aerosols among them. The figure anchors a new white paper from the association, Safety and Security in the Cargo Supply Chain, which argues that airport security screening alone cannot catch rogue shipments and pushes responsibility far upstream in the chain.

The statistic sharpens an uncomfortable commercial reality for shippers, forwarders and carriers: existing screening regimes were built to detect explosives and terror threats, not the full spectrum of hazardous materials. IATA is explicit on this point. Compliance failures, not gaps in the regulatory framework, are the core problem — the association notes that well-established Dangerous Goods Regulations already provide a framework for safe air transport of hazardous cargo, but adherence remains weak.

'Screening is not a complete solution'

Brendan Sullivan, IATA's Global Head of Cargo, framed the risk in terms of where cargo enters the system, not whether dangerous goods fly at all.

"Dangerous goods are transported safely by air every day. The risk comes when they enter the system undeclared or incorrectly declared. Every part of the supply chain has a role to play in identifying and stopping such incidents as soon as possible," Sullivan said.

"Security screening, which is primarily focused on terror threats, is one layer of protection against rogue shippers, but it is not a complete solution. A comprehensive multi-layer approach beginning as far upstream the supply chain as possible is essential."

The message carries direct consequences for acceptance procedures. Forwarders and postal operators face calls for tighter cargo acceptance controls and better-trained staff. IATA also wants them to make greater use of customer and shipment data to flag higher-risk consignments before they reach the airport — effectively a data-driven risk-screening layer that sits well ahead of physical inspection.

Responsibility distributed across the chain

The white paper assigns specific obligations to each stakeholder group:

• Governments must strengthen oversight and enforcement of dangerous goods requirements across the cargo supply chain.
• Manufacturers and online marketplaces must ensure dangerous goods are correctly identified and certified where necessary, with accurate product information.
• Shippers, freight forwarders and postal operators must improve staff training and acceptance controls, and use customer and shipment data to identify higher-risk cargo pre-airport.
• Airlines and ground handlers must strengthen checks before cargo is loaded onto aircraft.
• Airports must improve coordination and information sharing across the cargo community to identify and address risks promptly.

The inclusion of online marketplaces is notable. E-commerce volumes have swelled air cargo holds with consumer shipments of lithium batteries, e-cigarettes and aerosols — precisely the categories IATA identifies as driving undeclared incidents. Product data accuracy at the point of sale, the association implies, is now a safety control, not just a customer-service metric.

For carriers and ground handlers, the paper's recommendations translate into added verification work at a time when load factors remain elevated and turnaround windows tight. For compliant shippers, the likely trajectory is more documentation and acceptance scrutiny on hazardous or suspect consignments — and potentially longer dwell times for cargo flagged by data-based risk indicators.

Regulatory context

IATA issued the call amid ongoing discussions among regulators about the role existing aviation security screening processes play in preventing dangerous goods incidents. The white paper positions itself as a contribution to that debate: its stated aim is ensuring hazardous materials are properly declared and handled before they enter the air transport system, cutting the risks tied to concealed or incorrectly declared cargo.

The association's core argument is structural. No single checkpoint — least of all security screening designed around terror threats — can substitute for coordinated vigilance across manufacturers, sellers, shippers, forwarders, carriers, handlers, airports and regulators. Dangerous goods move safely by air every day when declared correctly; the failure mode is the shipment that never declares itself.

With 80 per cent of reported incidents in H1 2025 traced to undeclared or hidden hazardous materials, expect the enforcement pressure to land on acceptance controls and shipper data quality first — before regulators revisit what airport screening is asked to do.