56% of Air Freight Now Rides in Passenger Bellies — and That's the Problem

More than half of every tonne of air freight moved in 2025 — 56% — travelled in the belly of a passenger aircraft, not on a dedicated freighter. That single number does double duty. It records a record year for air cargo demand and it exposes a supply structure the industry doesn't directly control.

IATA puts 2025 demand growth at 3.4% year-on-year, a record volume. Yields fell 1.5% — the smallest annual decline in three years — and still sit 37.2% above 2019 levels. The market is normalising from pandemic highs, not deteriorating. For 2026, IATA forecasts demand growth moderating to 2.4%.

The growth was lopsided. Asia-Pacific carriers led all regions at 8.4%, African airlines grew 6.0%, European carriers 2.9%, and Latin American and Caribbean carriers 2.3%. Middle Eastern carriers, once the fastest-growing freight corridor, managed just 0.3%. North American carriers were the only grouping to decline, down 1.3% year-on-year.

Why does belly capacity carry so much risk?

The 56% share exists because the widebody freighter fleet has stalled. The narrowbody cargo market has been oversupplied since 2023, while the widebody market faces a persistent capacity shortage, according to Air Cargo News and aviation advisory firm IBA.

Belly space fills the gap. But belly space follows passenger route decisions, aircraft utilisation schedules and airline commercial priorities — not freight demand. When passenger networks contract, as they did sharply in 2020 and can do again for any number of reasons, belly capacity vanishes with them. The industry has nowhere near enough dedicated freighter capacity to absorb the shortfall.

The order book offers little near-term relief. Boeing's 777-8F, the most significant new widebody freighter in development, has slipped from a 2027 launch to 2028 at the earliest, Air Cargo News reports. Widebody freighter manufacturing supply chains remain unstable, and disruption is expected to continue for several years.

The conversion market has its own bottleneck. IBA notes the final Boeing 777-300ER left the production line in April 2022; that type is widely converted to freighter configuration, so its exit tightens the pipeline of future conversion candidates. Meanwhile, the average age of the cargo fleet runs significantly higher than the passenger fleet's, and the gap is widening — meaning higher maintenance costs, greater exposure to airworthiness directives, and the risk of aircraft leaving service faster than replacements arrive.

Mammoth Freighters completed the initial test flight of its 777-200LRMF prototype in May 2025, but the programme still waits on its supplemental type certificate. Until that lands, the aircraft can't enter commercial service and the widebody gap stays unaddressed.

At the premium end, IBA reports that AI-related and semiconductor shipments are driving demand for 747-400F and 747-8F aircraft specifically for their nose-loading capability, which takes outsized cargo a standard side door can't handle. That demand concentrating on ageing 747 variants shows how thin suitable widebody supply has become.

What does the North America decline signal?

The 1.3% drop by North American carriers is the only outright decline in the global picture, and it coincides with the trade policy shifts IATA identifies: Asia–North America flows giving way to Asia–Europe, driven by US tariff policy and the removal of the de minimis exemption for low-value parcels.

If those conditions persist, transpacific belly capacity will sit partly underutilised for freight even as the widebody freighter fleet stays short globally. That mismatch — belly capacity in one place, growing freight demand in another — is structural, not temporary.

The bottom line for shippers and carriers

The 56% belly share isn't a sign of a healthy, diversified market. It's what happens when a freighter fleet hasn't kept pace with demand, a widebody manufacturing pipeline runs years late, and conversions work through regulatory and supply-chain delays. The commercial case for new lift is as strong as it has ever been; the industry's ability to deliver it is not.

If passenger networks shrink — from an economic shock, geopolitical disruption or a demand shift — the belly capacity underpinning more than half of global air freight lift contracts with them, and no standby freighter fleet exists large enough to absorb it.